

AERONAUTICAL CHARTING FORUM
Instrument Procedures Group
April 26, 2016

RECOMMENDATION DOCUMENT

FAA Control # 16-01-324

Subject:

SID/STAR Naming Policy

Background/Discussion:

It is easy to confuse SIDs and STARs that begin with the same letter. For example KOKC has the Ghost.1 and Gulli.1 STARs and the TEBRD.1, THRPE.1, and TRUPR.1 SIDS. It would make it easier on flight crews if the beginning letters were only repeated when necessary (i.e., more than 24 SID's or STAR's). See attached 6 NASA ASRS reports.

Recommendations:

Name SIDs and STARs so that they don't start with the same letter. If unable to name SIDs and STARs in that manner, as an alternative, change the revision number on one procedure to make them different; i.e., TEBRD.1 and THRPE.2.

Comments:

Submitted by: Derek Benda

Organization: Love's Travel Stops

Phone: 636-248-2471

FAX:

E-mail: d.benda@hotmail.com

Date: 03/18/2016

ACN: 1314999

Time / Day

Date : 201512

Local Time Of Day : 0601-1200

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : CHS.Airport

State Reference : SC

Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 4000

Environment

Flight Conditions : IMC

Weather Elements / Visibility : Fog

Weather Elements / Visibility.Visibility : .75

Light : Daylight

Ceiling.Single Value : 400

Aircraft

Reference : X

ATC / Advisory.TRACON : CHS

Aircraft Operator : Corporate

Make Model Name : Citation Excel (C560XL)

Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 2

Operating Under FAR Part : Part 91

Flight Plan : IFR

Mission : Passenger

Flight Phase : Climb

Route In Use.SID : PLFMD1

Airspace.Class C : CHS

Component

Aircraft Component : FMS/FMC

Aircraft Reference : X

Problem : Improperly Operated

Person

Reference : 1

Location Of Person.Aircraft : X

Location In Aircraft : Flight Deck

Reporter Organization : Corporate

Function.Flight Crew : Captain

Function.Flight Crew : Pilot Not Flying

Qualification.Flight Crew : Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Qualification.Flight Crew : Multiengine

Qualification.Flight Crew : Instrument

Experience.Flight Crew.Total : 5400

Experience.Flight Crew.Last 90 Days : 103

Experience.Flight Crew.Type : 1700

ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1314999

Human Factors : Situational Awareness
Human Factors : Workload

Events

Anomaly.Deviation - Track / Heading : All Types
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Published Material / Policy
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Clearance
Anomaly.Inflight Event / Encounter : Weather / Turbulence
Detector.Person : Flight Crew
Detector.Person : Air Traffic Control
When Detected : In-flight
Result.Flight Crew : Returned To Clearance
Result.Flight Crew : Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification
Result.Flight Crew : Became Reoriented
Result.Air Traffic Control : Issued New Clearance

Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations : Weather
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Primary Problem : Human Factors

Narrative: 1

I would like to preface the event with what I believe to be a chain of events and distractions that led to the improper input and subsequent flying of the incorrect SID for the departure from Charleston, SC. (KCHS).

The flying pilot is new to the airplane and needed to get left seat time so the first two of three legs were to be flown by him. Our plan was to arrive one hour before our departure from KCHS with eight passengers. No fueling would be required. We left earlier to arrive at KCHS thirty minutes earlier than planned. Weather at destination was IMC as forecasted but still good enough for an approach. While enroute, weather became low IFR which was not in the forecast. During the approach briefing, we discussed the weather at our alternate, ZZZ, which was quickly deteriorating as it was VFR during our enroute phase of flight. Our briefing included the approach, missed approach procedures per the approach plate and the review the aircraft missed approach procedures as a review to the new pilot. ZZZ weather became IFR as we were being vectored for our ILS 33 approach into KCHS. We attempted an ILS approach to runway 33 followed by a missed approach. We then proceeded via radar vectors to our alternate, ZZZ, to fly the ILS approach to runway 09. I called our scheduler via SAT Phone and advised to contact the passengers for them to prepare to drive to ZZZ for pick up. I said I would call back if anything changed. Flight time from KCHS to ZZZ was roughly 8 minutes. We attempted the ILS approach but the weather quickly diminished and we were not able to "break out" at minimums. A missed approach was carried out followed by our request to hold via radar vectors in order to wait for the weather to improve and discuss alternatives. We had originally planned for no fuel uplift at KCHS so we were fueled to continue to our next destination plus alternate airport contingencies. During our holding, we had four hours fuel remaining. We were told by ATC that they were just informed by Weather Service that the weather would not improve for at least another hour. I called our scheduler back to advise the passengers to stay in KCHS until further notice.

During our holding, we overheard a King Air attempt an ILS approach into runway 33 followed by a missed approach. He was notified the RVR improved for runway 15 and he requested vectors for ILS 15. The King Air landed and reported "breaking out" at

minimums. Upon hearing of the King Air's success, we loaded and briefed the ILS 15 approach and then requested vectors for ILS 15. The approach was successful as we also saw the runway at minimums followed by a successful landing. The taxi to parking was low visibility. Upon parking, the time was now our original planned departure time. I notified our scheduler we had arrived. All eight passengers were waiting in the lobby and we now had an unscheduled fuel uplift for our next leg. I asked the flying pilot, since it was his next leg as well, if he was ok to prepare the cockpit and oversee fueling while I went inside to attend to passengers, bags and pay for services. He agreed. After my business in the FBO was complete and the fuel truck safely away, I brought the passengers to the plane and loaded their bags with some assistance of the flying pilot. I will note that during cockpit preparations for the next leg, the flying pilot informed me he left the flight deck during that preparation to assist the fueler. Before engine start, I noticed the V-speed were not posted on the PFDs. I verified on the FMS 1 Perf Page that the correct information was entered and it was. I reentered runway 15 and corresponding data for a runway 15 departure but the V-speeds still did not post. I then checked the MFD drop down menu and saw the Takeoff Speed setup was in MANUAL instead of AUTO. Once switched to AUTO, the V-speeds posted. I will also note that in my runway selection in the FMS, I did see the Allendale (ALD) transition so it was my understanding the PLFMD1 SID was loaded. I was not briefed by the flying pilot but it was stated we were cleared "as filed." After engine start and taxi request, we were assigned runway 22 instead of 15 as per the ATIS. I then had to re-enter Perf Data for the new runway. During my entries, no SID entries were made or changed, only runway. Visibility had improved considerably for our short taxi from the FBO to runway 22 [21]. Taxi time was around three to five minutes. We accomplished the required checklists and briefings and the SID was discussed briefly regarding fix and altitude requirements and I verified that 4,000 was set in the Alt Sel Window for the Flight Director. I did not reference the FMS as I was looking at the SID plate and then referencing the checklist.

We were cleared for takeoff after maybe two minutes of hold short. Tower said "clear for takeoff, fly the PLFMD departure." I acknowledged with a read back and we departed. It should also be noted that both RNAV SIDS begin with "PL" which can add confusion. (These SIDS are pronounced "PLUS MUD" and "PLUS TO.") At the pre-determined altitude, the aircraft began its turn but went left instead of right. We were then handed off to departure control and I checked on. The flying pilot may have entered the wrong departure frequency in the standby radio which we use as reminder/reference. I received no answer. Something did not look right to me at this second. I looked at the SID plate and noticed the frequency was different. I immediately realized the wrong SID was loaded in the FMS. As I stated before, I saw the ALD transition loaded in the FMS back on the ramp. I did not question it as it was our exit point from the SID. I quickly called ATC on the correct frequency. They soon realized as well and advised us that we were on the Northbound SID instead of the Westbound SID. I acknowledged and advised I was ready to copy a re-route. We received a couple of vectors and a frequency change then cleared direct ALD. There were no traffic conflicts. Both ATC and crew were very professional and orderly in their actions in quickly correcting course flown.

The day in question, the tower said "cleared for takeoff. Fly the Plus Mud Departure." When we departed again from KCHS [on a later flight] with the same clearance, we were simply "cleared for takeoff." There does not seem to be a standard.

It is my belief from the lengthy description above, that the high workload from the morning's flight environment with three approach attempts, pressures of departing on time for executives whom have never flown with our company before, the unscheduled fuel

uplift, the distractions that affected the flying pilot in the initial cockpit setup during fueling procedures, PFD/MFD functionality issues concerning V-speed postings, the last second runway change followed by a short taxi, contributed to the incorrect departure SID entry and failure to correctly identify the incorrect entry.

Even when all SOPS and checklists are followed, it is still entirely possible to make a mistake especially during a high workload environment. This event has been discussed by myself and the flying pilot over and over to try and understand the sequence of events that may have led to this omission. It has also been discussed with our Chief Pilot as well. We all agree that due to the high workload and pressures that morning that the proper thing to do is to slow procedures down and take your time. Re-check the details and look things over one more time. I do believe this type of event is common and flight departments, no matter the size and type of aircraft flown, need to discuss and review events like these to prevent the same pitfalls from happening to their crews as pressures mount during unplanned flight operations.

This event has been discussed with the crew and Chief Pilot. Corrective action was administered in the form of event review and suggested future recommendations should such high workload flight occur again.

Synopsis

A CE560 Captain describes the events leading up to the wrong RNAV departure being loaded into the FMC by the flying First Officer prior to departure from CHS. The PLMTO ONE was loaded instead of the PLFMD ONE.

ACN: 1287139

Time / Day

Date : 201508

Local Time Of Day : 1801-2400

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : OKC.Airport

State Reference : OK

Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 1800

Environment

Flight Conditions : VMC

Light : Daylight

Aircraft

Reference : X

ATC / Advisory.Tower : OKC

Aircraft Operator : Fractional

Make Model Name : Citation Excel (C560XL)

Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 2

Operating Under FAR Part : Part 91

Flight Plan : IFR

Mission : Ferry

Nav In Use : FMS Or FMC

Flight Phase : Takeoff

Route In Use.SID : TRUPR ONE

Airspace.Class C : OKC

Person : 1

Reference : 1

Location Of Person.Aircraft : X

Location In Aircraft : Flight Deck

Reporter Organization : Fractional

Function.Flight Crew : First Officer

Function.Flight Crew : Pilot Not Flying

Qualification.Flight Crew : Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1287139

Human Factors : Confusion

Human Factors : Communication Breakdown

Human Factors : Distraction

Person : 2

Reference : 2

Location Of Person.Aircraft : X

Location In Aircraft : Flight Deck

Reporter Organization : Fractional

Function.Flight Crew : Captain

Function.Flight Crew : Pilot Flying

Qualification.Flight Crew : Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1287140

Human Factors : Confusion

Human Factors : Communication Breakdown

Human Factors : Distraction

Events

Anomaly.Deviation - Track / Heading : All Types

Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Published Material / Policy

Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : FAR

Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Clearance

Detector.Person : Flight Crew

When Detected : In-flight

Result.Flight Crew : Became Reoriented

Result.Air Traffic Control : Issued New Clearance

Result.Air Traffic Control : Issued Advisory / Alert

Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors

Primary Problem : Human Factors

Narrative: 1

I convinced my captain to fly the wrong SID out of OKC. I cleaned and restocked the aircraft. When I returned to the plane, the captain had already picked up the clearance, and was finishing up setting up the cockpit. I read on the paper (handwritten) that we were given the THRPE1 THRPE TUS.... (Later I discovered this is where I made the error, we were assigned the TRUPR1.TRUPR TUS...). I had some difficulty reading his handwriting, and I simply had read it wrong.) I put the THRPE1 procedure into my [tablet] and saved it as the favorite (STAR). We then completed the required checklists. I think we must have used his [tablet] when we verified the route, as everything checked out between the [tablet] route and FMS (which we verified later was set up with the correct procedure.) After our taxi checklist, our SOP has the Pilot Flying verify the Initial Heading, Altitude and First Fix. I made a small SOP error by telling him what I thought the heading and altitude was, vs waiting for him to say what he thought it was to and me to verify. To be fair, I was convinced at this point we were flying the THRPE1, not the TRUPR1. I stated as part of the SOP, initial heading, altitude and fix that at 1,800 feet, we execute a right turn to 200. He hesitated, and then looked down at my [tablet] to verify. (My [tablet] was set on the wrong departure procedure however.). Because I showed him the plate (but the wrong one) he chose to believe the evidence I presented. I had convinced him that there was a turn at 1,800 feet and departed with the turn to 200 degrees. A few seconds after we turned, Oklahoma [City] tower gave us a left turn back to 175 degrees. I said something like (I guess tower forgot to tell us a nonstandard heading.). We both then noticed the FMS showed no turn. He then asked me which procedure I was displaying on my [tablet], as his writing said TRUPR. I looked again, and saw that it was TRUPR and not THRPE that I had thought I read. That is when we discovered I was showing him the wrong departure procedure. A second after the 175 heading was issued, we were told to contact departure. Departure never said anything about a deviation. The captain contacted the OKC control tower by telephone after we landed, I was told later by the captain that the person he talked to at the tower said that there was no deviation from us that they had heard about.

In the future I will ensure that the [tablet] used by the non-flying pilot is the one used during the FMS cross check. That would have lead to the discovery of the error. I should have waited for the Pilot in Command to give me his approaching the runway briefing (per the SOP), rather than give him mine first. The SOP procedures are all new in this fleet (about a month I think, 3rd tour using them), over time errors in "who says what" will be

corrected as we continue to use the new SOP. The previous flight has been conducted in a fairly hot cockpit. I should have taken another 5 to 10 minutes in the air conditioned FBO, as before the last flight I had been waiting in a cockpit that would not cool below 90 degrees on the ground, and still stayed warm for the previous less than an hour flight. Heat is fatiguing, which contributed to me reading his handwriting wrong. In this case the captain had obtained the clearance via PDC. I should have asked (I didn't know what way he had obtained the clearance) and if the opportunity presents itself, confirm my [tablet] directly with the printed PDC message. That would have limited the error. Either time anyone questions what they are being told by the other party, taxi the airplane to a safe position, tell ATC we need a few minutes, then resolve the problem without the distraction of taxing.

Narrative: 2

We were issued the **TRUPR1** departure, TRUPR, As Filed from Runway 17L. This departure was a vector SID of runway heading to 1,800 feet then heading 175 OR AS ASSIGNED. I obtained the clearance, programmed the box, and completed the configuration of the flight deck as the First Officer was busy with stocking and cleaning duties. Once he had joined me we briefed the flight per the new SOP and readied for departure. I stowed my EFB as his was designated the primary for the flight and we proceeded to start and taxi out. Nearing the runway he briefed initial HEADING, ALTITUDE, AND FIX per our new SOP however he had inadvertently selected the **THRPE1** departure. This departure is very similar and immediately precedes the TRUPR1 when the SIDs are displayed on the EFB. This departure is also a vector SID of runway heading to 1,800 feet, HOWEVER YOU THEN TURN RIGHT TO A 200 HDG AT 1,800 feet. I looked over at his EFB to verify as I remembered briefing the 1,800 feet but not the 200 heading after. I saw the depiction that was displayed and unfortunately assumed that I had either forgotten or had just been mistaken. I then accepted the change not realizing it was incorrect. As we climbed through 1,800 feet. and began our turn the tower controller called and instructed us to fly a heading of 175. There was no other traffic, we were issued no other corrections and the flight continued normally. We reached cruise altitude and soon discovered our error. Upon landing I called the KOKC tower to discuss the departure but was assured there was no problem. I however, see this as an opportunity to share just how easy it is to make an error even when your departure is a runway heading vector SID.

I could have avoided the confusion by setting the parking brake and confirming our differing interpretation of the action at 1,800 feet and comparing MY EFB to HIS EFB which I feel would have caught the error and solved the problem. I think the similarity in the names of the departures and procedure itself also allowed me to be more comfortable with my incorrect assumptions. This is an example of how important attention to detail is and being certain of your actions through a thorough and accurate brief.

Thank you for your time.

Synopsis

Citation crew initially flew the wrong SID. ATC noticed the error and issued a new heading.

ACN: 1166135

Time / Day

Date : 201404

Local Time Of Day : 0601-1200

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : DEN.Airport

State Reference : CO

Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 10000

Environment

Flight Conditions : VMC

Aircraft

Reference : X

ATC / Advisory.TRACON : D01

Aircraft Operator : Air Carrier

Make Model Name : A319

Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 2

Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121

Flight Phase : Climb

Airspace.Class B : DEN

Component

Aircraft Component : FMS/FMC

Aircraft Reference : X

Problem : Improperly Operated

Person : 1

Reference : 1

Location Of Person.Aircraft : X

Location In Aircraft : Flight Deck

Reporter Organization : Air Carrier

Function.Flight Crew : First Officer

Function.Flight Crew : Pilot Not Flying

Experience.Flight Crew.Total : 6500

Experience.Flight Crew.Last 90 Days : 68

ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1166135

Human Factors : Situational Awareness

Human Factors : Human-Machine Interface

Human Factors : Time Pressure

Person : 2

Reference : 2

Location Of Person.Aircraft : X

Location In Aircraft : Flight Deck

Reporter Organization : Air Carrier

Function.Flight Crew : Captain

Function.Flight Crew : Pilot Flying

Experience.Flight Crew.Total : 17075

Experience.Flight Crew.Last 90 Days : 335

Experience.Flight Crew.Type : 700
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1166151
Human Factors : Confusion
Human Factors : Human-Machine Interface

Events

Anomaly.Deviation - Track / Heading : All Types
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Clearance
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Published Material / Policy
Detector.Person : Air Traffic Control
When Detected : In-flight
Result.Flight Crew : Became Reoriented
Result.Flight Crew : Returned To Clearance
Result.Air Traffic Control : Issued Advisory / Alert
Result.Air Traffic Control : Issued New Clearance

Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations : Procedure
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Primary Problem : Human Factors

Narrative: 1

This flight was the second flight of the day and the third day of a four-day trip. In preparation for multiple runway takeoff options from DEN, we loaded the flight plan into the FMGC with our expected runway (Runway 08) and then loaded the secondary flight plan with our alternate runway (Runway 34R) with the plan of just activating the secondary flight plan if we did not receive our primary runway because there would be a very short taxi to [Runway] 34R. We had filed the EEONS3 SID. Our PDC was not available, so we had to contact Clearance Delivery for clearance and were given the EMMYS3 SID in the re-route. We loaded the change into the primary flight plan but failed to change the secondary. Had we taken off on Runway 08, this mistake would have had no consequence, but after pushback we were told to expect Runway 34R. In haste, we activated the secondary flight plan. Along with slightly similar names of the SIDs and the fact that we were initially expecting the EEONS3, the first few points were identical on both SIDs so it was not initially obvious there was a problem with our loaded flight plan. This technique was new to me and I did not fully think through the consequences should we actually use it. Shortly after takeoff, we were cleared to climb via the EMMYS3 SID. While not a surprise, this was the first time that I had flown a climb via clearance that had altitude constraints. This caused me to be preoccupied with meeting altitude constraints and to miss the fact that after point HIDEF we were headed towards SHOBO instead of BRSTO, 20 degrees off course. Approximately 7-8 miles beyond HIDEF, we were notified by Denver Approach of our deviation and given a heading to correct. After being notified of the deviation, we immediately understood the error that occurred, corrected the FMGC and ensured the remainder of the flight plan was correct.

Narrative: 2

We manually had to receive our clearance from Clearance Delivery. We were given the EMMYS3 RNAV Departure. We had preloaded the EEONS3 RNAV Departure Runway 8 as per our flight plan. We also preloaded the EEONS3 Runway 34 in the secondary. We still expected Runway 8 for departure and loaded the EMMYS3 in the primary flight plan in the FMGC. I saw the First Officer load and check the EMMYS3 in the primary and checked his work. On pushback we were told to expect Runway 34R on departure. We activated the secondary flight plan then got busy with checklists and checking weights and taxiing. The

first speed constraint as well as the first two or three points on the EEONS3 Departure is the same as the EMMYS3 departure. Our data base mistake was not realized until ATC saw we were flying to point SHOBO on the EEONS3 vs. BRSTO on the EMMYS3. Because the first points were the same we missed our mistake and flew the wrong departure.

Synopsis

A319 flight crew describes the circumstances leading up to selecting the wrong SID for a departure from DEN.

ACN: 1005575

Time / Day

Date : 201204

Local Time Of Day : 1801-2400

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : MEM.Airport

State Reference : TN

Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 2500

Aircraft : 1

Reference : X

ATC / Advisory.TRACON : M03

Aircraft Operator : Air Carrier

Make Model Name : Widebody, Low Wing, 3 Turbojet Eng

Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 2

Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121

Flight Plan : IFR

Flight Phase : Initial Climb

Airspace.Class B : MEM

Aircraft : 2

Reference : Y

ATC / Advisory.TRACON : M03

Aircraft Operator : Air Carrier

Make Model Name : Medium Transport, Low Wing, 2 Turbojet Eng

Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 2

Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121

Flight Plan : IFR

Flight Phase : Initial Climb

Route In Use.SID : CRSON1

Airspace.Class B : MEM

Person

Reference : 1

Location Of Person.Facility : M03.TRACON

Reporter Organization : Government

Function.Air Traffic Control : Departure

Qualification.Air Traffic Control : Fully Certified

ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1005575

Human Factors : Confusion

Events

Anomaly.ATC Issue : All Types

Anomaly.Conflict : Airborne Conflict

Anomaly.Deviation - Track / Heading : All Types

Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Clearance

Detector.Person : Air Traffic Control

Result.Air Traffic Control : Issued New Clearance

Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations : Procedure
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Primary Problem : Procedure

Narrative: 1

Aircraft X, and Aircraft Y, departed MEM simultaneously. Aircraft X departed Runway 36L. Aircraft Y departed Runway 36C. I noticed Aircraft Y commencing a left turn into Aircraft X at roughly the same altitude. I immediately turned Aircraft X left heading 230 and amended his altitude to maintain 3,000 FT. Once standard IFR separation was established, I sent Aircraft X on his way and climbed him. **There are two north SIDs that are closely named (CRSON and CASLN)**. One of the two needs to be renamed. Aircraft Y was supposed to have been on the CRSON1 departure as cleared. In fact, the aircraft was navigating via the CASLN1 departure. That was the root cause of the issue, I believe. This is not the first occurrence that I know of. The last time, there was not an aircraft on departure from another runway.

Synopsis

M03 **Controller described a developing conflict when traffic issued the CRSON SID was navigating via the CASLN SID**, the reporter noting that this was not the first instance of pilots confusing these similar SID names.

ACN: 497620

Time / Day

Date : 200101

Local Time Of Day : 1201-1800

Place

Locale Reference.Navaid : TUL.VORTAC

State Reference : OK

Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 35000

Environment

Flight Conditions : VMC

Light : Daylight

Aircraft

Reference : X

ATC / Advisory.Center : ZKC.ARTCC

Aircraft Operator : Air Carrier

Make Model Name : Medium Transport, Low Wing, 2 Turbojet Eng

Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 2

Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121

Flight Plan : IFR

Mission : Passenger

Flight Phase : Cruise

Route In Use.STAR : UKW.UKW6

Airspace.Class A : ZKC.A

Person : 1

Reference : 1

Location Of Person.Aircraft : X

Reporter Organization : Air Carrier

Function.Flight Crew : Pilot Flying

Function.Flight Crew : First Officer

Qualification.Flight Crew : Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Experience.Flight Crew.Total : 3600

Experience.Flight Crew.Last 90 Days : 220

Experience.Flight Crew.Type : 11

ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 497620

Person : 2

Reference : 2

Location Of Person.Aircraft : X

Reporter Organization : Air Carrier

Function.Flight Crew : Pilot Not Flying

Function.Flight Crew : Captain

Qualification.Flight Crew : Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Person : 3

Reference : 3

Location Of Person.Facility : ZKC.ARTCC

Reporter Organization : Government

Function.Air Traffic Control : Enroute
Qualification.Air Traffic Control : Fully Certified

Events

Anomaly.Deviation - Track / Heading : All Types
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Published Material / Policy
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Clearance
Anomaly.Other
Detector.Person : Air Traffic Control
Result.Flight Crew : Returned To Clearance

Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Primary Problem : Human Factors

Narrative: 1

SCHEDULED FOR FROM CEDAR RAPIDS, IA, TO DALLAS FT WORTH, TX. TWICE ENRTE GIVEN NEW CLRNC. FIRST RERTE WAS TO BONHAM AND **BONHAN 3** ARR. NEXT WAS TO DIRECT TULSA THEN (WE THOUGHT) BONHAM 3/TULSA TRANSITION INTO DFW. AS WE CROSSED TUL VOR AND TURNED, WE WERE ADVISED BY ATC WE WERE GOING THE WRONG WAY -- SUPPOSED TO BE DOING THE **BOWIE 6**/TULSA TRANSITION. TURNED ON COURSE WITH NO FURTHER INCIDENT. EITHER ATC GAVE US WRONG SECOND RERTE OR WE MISINTERPED CLRNC.

Synopsis

MDT CREW MISINTERPED ATC'S CLRNC, MAKING TRANSITION TO WRONG STAR.